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Women Acting for Women? An
Analysis of Gender and Debate
Participation in the British House
of Commons 2005–2007
Ana Catalano
London School of Economics
INTRODUCTION
T he recent push for morewomen parliamentarians around theworld viapositive action measures such as gender quotas naturally begs the
question of whether the increased descriptive representation of women in
parliament is making a substantive difference, in terms of the types of
policies passed, behavioral norms, and procedures. How does the
substantive representation of women take place? One way of measuring
gendered impacts in politics is to look at the participation of Members of
Parliament (MPs) in formal, parliamentary debate on key policy issues. It
is reasonable to assume that one (though certainly not the only) measure
of a good MP is his or her ability to contribute his or her voice and
thoughts to public policy debates in parliament. Furthermore, if we
consider women MPs representative of women in particular as a
marginalized group, making their voices heard in parliamentary debates
is perhaps one of the best ways of acting for women. As Melissa Williams
(1998, 138) argues, the unique voice of women is a necessary
component for women’s political equality:
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It is not enough that women communicate their perspectives to men; a full
respect for women’s agency, and a full protection of their interests, requires
that they act on their own behalf. Only through their legislative presence can
women be sure that the “woman’s point of view” on each policy issue is
formulated and expressed.
Women as a group share no exclusive set of political interests aside from
the eradication of gender-based discrimination. Traditionally, gender has
not been regarded as one of the main voter cleavages (e.g., social class,
race, region, and religion) because men and women are thought to
experience many of the same, cross-cutting forces (Lipset and Rokkan
1967). The gender gap in Britain has recently shifted away from
conservatism, with 2005 marking the first election when more women
voted for Labour (38%) than Conservative (32%) (Cowling 2005). It is
understandable, given the fact that discriminatory laws still exist and the
structure of most parliaments is still based upon the universal
disembodied male (Puwar 2004), that women parliamentarians might be
expected to contribute a “woman’s point of view” to certain issues that
affect women in particular (e.g., breast cancer care in the National
Health Service). It is not so understandable that women are often
expected to participate in public discourse on whole categories of
legislation (e.g. education, health care) and not to participate in others
(e.g. foreign policy, finance). In a study of Norwegian MPs, Hege Skjeie
found a consensus across party lines and sex that gender does and should
make a difference in political interests. A majority of representatives saw
women as particularly concerned with policies on welfare, the
environment, equality, education, and disarmament, while men were
said to be more interested in the economy, industry, energy, national
security, and foreign affairs (Skjeie 1991). If such assumptions were
made by representatives in one of the world’s most equal and socially
progressive parliaments (of the time, and today), then there is good
reason to think that they are widespread.
The British case offers some evidence that women MPs are thought to
have a particular set of political issues and interests because they are
women. Research on parliamentary candidates and MPs in the 1992 and
1997 elections found that, compared to men in each party, women were
more supportive of feminist and left-wing values and expressed stronger
concerns about social policy issues. However, in all cases the gender gap
was small, and political party proved the strongest predictor of a
representative’s values and attitudes (Norris 1996, 2000; Norris and
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Lovenduski 1995). In all likelihood, politicians are reflecting the
preferences of their (or their party’s) constituents. In an analysis of the
British Election Studies (BES) and British Social Attitudes Surveys,
Rosie Campbell (2004) finds some evidence that there is a “women’s
interest” in the British electorate, albeit with important subgroup
differences. Women are more likely to prioritize education and health
care issues, and men are more likely to select the economy as their most
important election issue (Campbell 2004: data from BES 2001).
Anecdotal evidence further contributes to the stereotype. When the
1997 British general election resulted in record numbers of women
MPs, one male Conservative MP commented that he feared that the
women “will start meddling in defence policy, increasing the aid budget
and deploying peace-keeping troops everywhere” (cited in the Spectator,
24 May 2007, as quoted in Puwar 2004, 54). Such comments are
startling because they occur in what many people consider to be gender-
neutral institutions (e.g., electoral systems and governments). They are
useful because they encourage one to think about how one might
operationalize and analyze gender and political participation across
various issue areas.
This study undertakes a quantitative analysis of second reading bill debates
in the British House of Commons. The analysis considers debates on health
care (a “soft” policyareaconsidered “women’s interest”) and finance (a “hard”
policy area consideredmore masculine) over a two-year period of the current
legislature (May 2005–August 2007). It addresses two questions. First, does
sex makes a difference in the likelihood of an MP contributing his or her
voice to the formal policy discussion of different issue areas? Second, if sex
does make a difference, does this indicate that women are using debate as a
forum to achieve greater substantive representation in areas of perceived
women’s interests?
The hypothesis tested is that women will be more likely to participate in
health care debates than men because they feel a particular, gendered duty
to represent women’s perspectives on issues popularly construed as
“women’s issues.” In finance debates, the hypothesis is that women MPs
will be less likely to participate than men, both because male MPs may
feel a gendered duty to participate in issues often construed as masculine
and because women are often perceived to have less expertise than men
in this issue area, and thus may be sidelined.
The article proceeds as follows: First, a theoretical section provides an
essential framework, situating gender and debate participation within the
wider context of women’s political representation. A review of the
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secondary literature on women’s descriptive and substantive representation,
along with a brief explanation of the British parliamentary system, gives the
reader a greater understanding of why certain methodological choices were
made. Some hypotheses are then put forward about the possible effects of
sex as well as six other (control) variables on participation in health care and
finance bill debates. Next, data and methods are described, including
operationalization of the variables. Finally, the analysis and models
themselves are set forth, concluding with a discussion of the findings and
implications for future research.
WHY DOES GENDER MATTER?
The question of how gender affects debate participation is important
because it is part of the broader discussion of women’s representation
and participation in politics. The dominant understanding of political
representation in competitive party systems is that politics is about ideas
(substance). In this model, voters make decisions about which candidate
to support on the basis of policies and programs — not on personal
characteristics such as sex, race, class, attractiveness, or family
background. These individual characteristics are thought to be irrelevant
(Phillips 1995). In practice, however, women are underrepresented in
nearly every parliament in the world.
As of February 29, 2008, the percentage of women in single or lower
houses of national parliaments worldwide stood at 18.0%, more than
double the rate of 8.1% in 1965 (Inter-Parliamentary Union 2008).
While this progress is significant, compared to economic opportunities,
education, and legal rights, political representation is the area in which
the gap between men and women has narrowed the least (Norris and
Inglehart 2003). Today, the United Kingdom ranks 59th in the world
with 19.5% (126/646) women in national parliament, behind such
countries as Rwanda, China, and Iraq. Within Europe, the UK is
roughly on a par with the regional averages of 20.9% (Organization for
Security and Co-operation in Europe member countries, including
Nordic countries) and 19.0% (excluding Nordic countries), respectively
(Inter-Parliamentary Union 2007).
The underrepresentation of women in parliaments worldwide indicates
that political values and behaviors are, in fact, gendered. As an historically
marginalized group, women traditionally have been left out of political life.
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Women achieved full suffrage in the UK in 1928; however, British political
parties did not select women for winnable seats in significant numbers until
the mid-1990s (Lovenduski 2005). While a detailed discussion of why
women remain underrepresented today is beyond the scope of this
article, entrenched patterns of social norms, combined with direct and
indirect discrimination, will serve as an (apologetically) simplified
explanation. Women today continue to bear the main caretaking
responsibilities at home and in the workplace. So long as the sexual
division of labor remains unbalanced, it is difficult to imagine women
feeling able to manage a full-time career in politics and running for
political office (Phillips 1999). Women face indirect discrimination
because the conditions under which women-friendly policy changes,
such as more nurseries or family-oriented working hours, are likely to
occur are not those in which predominantly male MPs determine the
political agenda. Furthermore, when women do buck the social norms
and run for office, they may face subtle or direct discrimination, as has
been the case, for example, in British selection committees (Shepherd-
Robinson and Lovenduski 2002).
Women’s underrepresentation is related to central issues of how to ensure
equal and fair representation for all citizens; namely, in what ways, and to
what extent, does the fair representation of women depend upon their
physical presence within legislative bodies? The concept of descriptive
representation has emerged as a model for addressing the question of how
to ensure political representation for disadvantaged groups. In descriptive
representation, representatives are, in their own persons and lives, in some
sense typical of a larger class of persons whom they represent (Griffiths
and Wolheim 1960). The idea, applied to gender, is that women
representatives can represent women constituents better than men can. As
Anne Phillips (1995) postulates, a “politics of presence” is needed to
supplement the lofty (and unrealized) ideal of the politics of ideas.
Women Acting for Women? The Complicated Relationship
between Descriptive and Substantive Representation
Theorists disagree about the extent to which descriptive representation
leads to substantive representation, if at all. Some proponents of
descriptive representation build the case for greater representation for
women without referencing substantive effects at all. These theorists
claim that women should be equally represented in parliament either for
WOMEN ACTING FOR WOMEN? 49
justice reasons — because women compose 50% of most populations
(e.g., Scott 1997) — or for symbolic reasons — because the historical
absence of women in political institutions may be associated with
perceptions of women’s second-class citizenship and the notion that
politics is a “male domain.” Such theorists make no assertions about
women acting differently or having a different set of policy preferences
than do men. Others contend that beyond the justice or symbolic
arguments for greater physical representation, women contribute
something different to politics (e.g., Childs 2005; Lovenduski 2005;
Mansbridge 1999). This notion, that women MPs will act for women as
a group, serves as the major theoretical underpinning of this article.
The notion of women’s feminizing of politics is controversial because it
runs the risk of essentializing women, implying that as a group, they
inherently share a set of policy preferences or ideology. Women are not a
monolithic entity with a collective set of interests and beliefs. One could
cite many examples of female political figures who represent the
antithesis of what many regard as “women’s interests” (e.g., Margaret
Thatcher). In order to make the claim that the fair representation of
women requires their legislative presence, one must adduce something
that members of women as a group share because of their historical
marginalization, rather than their essential (biological) nature (Williams
1998). Furthermore, it is not a guarantee that women representatives will
act for women, only that they will be more likely to act for women than
will men (Phillips 1995). Any carefully considered study of the
connection between women’s descriptive and substantive representation
should take into account the inevitable problems that arise when one
conceives of gender as a spectrum but sees practical value in
categorizing it as a dichotomy. Keeping in mind the complexities and
limitations of this method, this study uses sex as a proxy for gender in
order to make some empirical claims about the gendered behavior of
women and men MPs.
Finally, it is worth noting that the simple increase of women’s numbers
in parliament is not exclusively responsible for furthering women’s
interests. The substantive representation of women occurs on many
interacting levels. Positional power, strategic alliances, coalitions, and
relationships with women’s movements, not to mention the numerous
political roles outside parliament, are all crucial in making women-
friendly policy change (Celis and Childs 2008). Even within the
universe of a politician’s role, parliamentary activities (such as
introducing legislation, debating, and voting) are only some of the ways
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in which women MPs can act for women. While not the only or even
necessarily the best mechanisms to make substantive change,
parliamentary activities are particularly high profile — and thus “high
stakes.” As such, the floor of the parliament is perhaps the best forum for
women literally to make their voices heard.
LITERATURE REVIEW: THE COMPLEX RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
DESCRIPTIVE AND SUBSTANTIVE REPRESENTATION
Traditionally, the assessment of claims that women act for women has
focused upon the who (descriptive) and the what (substantive), rather
than the how (Squires 2005). Studies have relied upon the concept of
“critical mass theory,” that once women achieve a certain proportion in
parliament, political culture, behavior, and policy will be changed or
feminized (Childs and Krook 2008). Addressing the who, empirical
studies have analyzed the impacts of greater numbers of women in
parliament. Roll-call vote analysis is perhaps the most obvious
empirical method of assessing sex differences in legislative behavior.
Studies of roll-call voting in the United States have analyzed whether
women were more liberal than their male colleagues, with mixed
results (e.g., Burrell 1994; McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal 1997; Welch
1985). A study of the voting behavior of Labour MPs during the 1997
Parliament found that newly elected women were less likely to rebel
against the party whip as the rest of the parliamentary party, even when
controlling for a range of other factors (Cowley and Childs 2003). A
classic but increasingly criticized method, roll-call voting can only
begin to explore how gender differences in legislative participation
might affect substantive transformations. The indiscriminate use of
critical mass theory cannot take into account how representatives
identify with gender, the impact of minority members, the other
activities that MPs engage in, and “critical acts of change” (Dahlerup
1988; Dovi 2003).
Addressing the what of substantive change for women, qualitative efforts
to examine women’s political and gendered motivations and intentions
have found that women MPs see themselves as acting for women and
empathize with them in particular. The record number of women
ushered into the House of Commons after the landslide Labour victory
of 1997, in particular, has provided a “rich laboratory” for scholars of
gender and politics. Sarah Childs finds that many women MPs expressly
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seek to represent women, and that women MPs believe that they have
raised women’s concerns in Parliament, having a positive effect on
policy addressing violence against women, child care, and equal
opportunities (Childs 1999, 2001, 2004). Many of Labour’s new women
MPs claim to have acted for women since their election (Childs and
Withey 2004). Fiona MacKay’s 2001 work on Scottish councillors
mirrors work at Westminster, finding that elected women believe that
they have a responsibility to act for women by raising certain issues like
child care, domestic violence, and equal opportunity issues in policy
debates.
Connecting the who and the what of descriptive and substantive
representation in meaningful ways involves addressing the how, or
behavioral mediation. Recently, a call has been made for scholars to
make a shift in their research question from “when women make a
difference” to “how the substantive representation of women occurs”
(Childs and Krook 2006). Studies addressing this question narrow the
focus of analysis to how sex and gender play a role within particular loci
or mechanisms of change. For example, Alisa Henderson (2005)
examines the plenary behavior of MPs in the Scottish Parliament’s first
year of debates and finds that women participate differently from men;
women participate much later than men in almost all aspects of plenary
debate, are more likely to participate in Members’ Business Debates, and
less likely to prompt or engage interventions. In an examination of more
than 300 plenary debates in the National Assembly for Wales, Paul
Chaney (2006) finds that women parliamentarians have a greater
propensity than their male colleagues to initiate and engage in political
debate on women’s issues. In the British case, work on the signing of
Early Day Motions (EDMs) in the 1997 Parliament shows that Labour
women were more likely than Labour men to sign women’s and feminist
women’s EDMs in particular (Childs and Withey 2004). Karen Bird
(2005) finds that women speak more often than men on issues of sex and
gender.
This article agrees with the proposed need to focus new research on how
change takes place and to acknowledge the complexities that multiple sites
and actors bring to women’s substantive representation. It takes debate
participation in the House of Commons as its point of inquiry. The
following brief explanation of the British parliamentary system gives the
reader a general understanding of the model, as well as insights as to why
debate participation was chosen as the focus of analysis over other
parliamentary or political activities.
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THE BRITISH PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEM
Various ways that British MPs might express their views and those of their
constituents were taken into account in order to develop a logical
methodology for operationalizing women’s political participation across
different issue areas. Firstly, the form of participation had to be public,
due to the stated purpose of this study to focus on women’s voice. Four
forms of quantifiable public participation in Westminster politics were
considered for the analysis: debate on the floor, debate in committee,
written questions, and Early Day Motions (EDMs). Of these, debates on
the floor seemed most fitting because they require direct, vocal, and
public participation. Politicians will expect their participation in debates
to have a higher degree of public scrutiny (Barnett 2002). By focusing
upon participation in plenary sessions, this study assesses whether a
representative’s voice is being heard and registered in the most public
proceedings of the British legislative process.
Having said this, it is important to note that excluding other forms of
participation, such as committee meetings, leaves out many elements
that might uncover different levels and styles of political contribution
according to gender or other factors. Particularly because of the highly
adversarial style of debate in the British system, women MPs may prefer
to act for women via other forms of political participation. Focusing on
gendered behavior in committee work or even work in the constituency
could be a natural next step in this line of research, and findings could
be compared and contrasted with plenary behavior.
A few key points about the process of debate in the House of Commons
inform the research. Although debate, or formal discussion, in the House
of Commons may include legislation, general topics of interest, or issues
selected by the major parties, this article focuses only upon legislation. In
any session, roughly 50% of parliamentary time will be spent scrutinizing
proposed legislation (Barnett 2002). Debates on legislation have three key
stages in the House of Commons: the first reading, when the bill is
introduced as a formality; the second reading, which is generally seen as
the substantive stage and the one in which the most debate is heard; and
the third reading, when no further amendments may be made and debate
is usually very short (“Parliamentary Stages of a Government Bill” 2007).
This article analyzes debate in the second reading stage of legislation.
Debate in the House of Commons is famously adversarial. Unlike most
legislative bodies, which sit in a semicircle, in the Commons the chamber is
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rectangular, pitting government benches against opposition benches —
separated by a distance of two sword lengths (Barnett 2002). Members must
be called upon to speak in debate by the Speaker of the House. MPs may
write in advance to indicate their wish to speak in a certain debate, but this is
no guarantee. In any debate, an MP must get the Speaker’s attention (called
“catching the Speaker’s eye”), usually by half-standing from his or her seat.
The gendered aspects of debate in theHouse of Commons have been well
documented. It has been said that men are more likely to gain and hold the
floor in such formal arenas and to speak for longer periods of time than
women, who tend to “leave the floor to men” (Holmes 1995, 193). Sir
George Young MP, Conservative Leader of the House for much of the
1997 Parliament, claimed that the influx of new Labour women MPs after
the 1997 elections did “make less noise in the chamber” (Young 2000, 8).
Work on the gendered dynamics of political discourse has shown that men
are more likely to interrupt other MPs via illegal interventions, whereas
women tend to follow the Commons’ legislative procedure quite
stringently (Shaw 2000). Women MPs have also reported a range of
constraints and sexist treatment in the House of Commons (see, e.g., Jackie
Ashley, “Women MPs bullied and abused in Commons,” The Guardian,
7 December 2004 [Politics section]). While parliamentary debate is a
crucial forum for women MPs to speak for women as a group, it is also
important to remember that women’s participation may be mitigated by
the subtle or direct sexism of the institution.
EXPLANATORY VARIABLES AND HYPOTHESES
This study is primarily concerned with analyzing the effects of sex on policy
debate participation in two different issue areas, finance and health care
Sex is considered to be a proxy for gender, though it is acknowledged
that a range would be more appropriate than a dichotomous variable for
measuring the latter (Withey 2003). In addition to sex, six additional
explanatory variables are included in the analysis: seniority, relevant
committee membership, political party, leadership position, attendance
rate, and rebellion rate. Following is a brief discussion of why each
explanatory variable is included and what its expected effects are.
Seniority has long been correlated with the likelihood of representatives’
participation in formal debate. D. R. Matthews’s classical 1960 study of the
folkways of the U.S. Senate found an “amateur” effect in which new
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members are expected to be “seen and not heard.” Confirming this insight,
more recent studies have shown that the amount of legislative activity,
including participating in debates, significantly increases between the
first and second terms of a U.S. representative’s career (Hibbing 1991),
and that seniority has a positive effect on debate participation in the
Honduran Congress, with the most frequent speakers having at least one
term of experience (Taylor-Robinson and David 2002). From these
findings, it is reasonable to assume that more senior MPs participate
more frequently in debate than those with fewer terms under their belts.
Relevant committee membership has also been found to be a significant and
positive predictor of debate participation. Matthews (1960) found that
relevant committee members, particularly the chairmen of the committees,
were (informally) expected to lead floor debate on related bills. In his 1996
study of the U.S. Congress, R. L. Hall found that the debate of a bill tends
to be dominated by the relevant committee members. In the British
context, it is logical to assume that the expertise accrued by membership of
a select committee (or perhaps the previous expertise indicated by selection
for a committee) might make an MP with relevant committee membership
more likely to participate in debate than others.
Positions of leadership in the governing or opposition party often require
speaking as part of the formal role, for example, clarifying the official
position or responding to questions about what action the executive is
taking on a certain issue. Empirically, some work has shown that
leadership position positively affects the likelihood of a representative
participating in debate. Michelle Taylor-Robinson and Sky David (2002)
find that holding a leadership position modestly increases the likelihood
of participating in debate. Thus, one might assume that leaders of the
government and the Official Opposition might be more likely to
participate in debates than would backbenchers.
In British politics, the focus for the party in government (in the period
studied, Labour) is to implement the party’s platform of national-level
policies (Kavanagh 1987). The role of the party of the Official
Opposition (in the period studied, Conservative, though the Liberal
Democrats are also included in the analysis as the third largest party) is
(at least formally) not to prevent these policies from being passed,
because to do so would be to ignore the mandate given by the people
to the governing party, but to question these policies as thoroughly as
possible. From the point of view of the opposition, it is particularly
important for backbencher Members to participate in debate, lending
support to the opposition’s claims about the government (Barnett
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2002). Thus, Conservative MPs may be more likely to participate in
debate than Labour or other party members.
An MP’s attendance rate in the House of Commons is perhaps a good
proxy for the value that the MP places on legislative debate, as opposed
to other forms of legislative participation, such as constituency or
committee work. Moreover, an MP who is present much of the time has
more opportunities to participate in debate than an MP who is not
present as often. Members with high attendance rates may participate in
debates more frequently than those with low attendance rates.
Rebellion rates are another potentially significant predictor of MPs’
debate participation. Because party discipline is quite strict in the UK,
an MP might feel the need to participate in debate to justify his or her
opposition to the party line if he or she is planning to vote against the
party. This sense might be particularly pronounced for women who do
not wish to upset the party because of their electoral situations. Many of
the women in this analysis were first elected in 1997, partly due to the
Labour use of all-women’s short lists. Interviews with Labour women
MPs in 2000 found that several of the women themselves felt this
pressure, with one commenting that “most of us come from key seats,
they [men likely to rebel] are marginal seats, and to be frank we are not
stupid“(Cowley and Childs 2003, from interviews on June 13 and May
10, 2000). One might expect Members with high rebellion rates to
participate more often in debate than those with low rebellion rates.
Finally, the critical variable for this study, an MP’s sex may affect his or
her likelihood to participate in debate, or in certain types of debate.
Though the study makes no normative claims, the stereotype is that
women are more likely to be interested in “soft” policy issues, such as
health care, education, and family affairs, than “hard” policy issues like
finance or foreign policy (Lovenduski 2005). Because of the reasons
previously discussed, women MPs may have a greater interest in speaking
in policy debates on issues that they view — or understand their
constituents to view — as disproportionately affecting women. Women
MPs may see health care as a women’s issue because of the traditional
caretaking role of women, because nearly all women go to the hospital
to have children, and because women take their children and others they
care for to the hospital. Although financial affairs certainly affect women
as well, the masculine association may be due to the historical, structural
division of labor. Capital markets traditionally have been and are still
predominantly controlled by men. In addition, financial matters have
always served as one of the core policy areas of governance, whereas
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issues like education and health care have taken up a bigger part of the
legislative agenda relatively more recently, following the rise of the
European social model after World War II. Financial matters may be
perceived to be more masculine because of the long-term, strong
association with traditional (male) governance.
DATA AND METHODS
The data for this study were collected from the parliamentary sessions of the
2005–2007 British House of Commons. Data collection involved reading
all transcripts of bills related to health care and finance within this time
period and taking note of Members who participated, in speech or
(spoken) intervention, and how many times that Member participated.
The source of these transcripts was Hansard (the Official Report See
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/pahansard.htm), the edited
verbatim report of proceedings in both Houses. There are nine second
reading debates related to health care and eight second reading debates
related to finance in this period. See Table 1, “Debate Participation in
Health Care and Finance-Related Bills in the May 2005–August 2007
UK House of Commons,” for a summary of MPs’ participation in all
health care and finance-related second -reading debates during this period.
The dependent variables in the two models, health care debate
participation and finance debate participation, are operationalized as the
number of interventions (regardless of length) made by each Member
during health care debates and, separately, during finance debates. The
Speaker of the House and deputies were taken out of the analysis as their
participation in debate is of a different nature. Additionally, Members
whose attendance rates in the House of Commons were 0% were taken
out of the analysis (i.e., Sinn Fein Members). Interruptions were
included in participation if the Member was recorded as speaking; if the
Member was noted in Hansard as standing, gesturing, or otherwise non-
audibly participating in debate, this was not included in the data.
The independent variables of “Female,” “Leadership Position,” “Health
Committee,” and “Finance Committees” are binary (where female¼ 1,
leadership position (Cabinet or Shadow Cabinet)¼ 1, and membership on
a relevant select committee ¼ 1). Two binary variables, “Conservative” and
“Liberal Democrat,” in which Members from the named party¼ 1,
measure the effect of the main political parties in opposition. “Seniority” is
the number of previous terms that each Member served in the House of
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Table 1. Debate participation in health care and finance-related bills in the May 2005–August 2007 UK House of Commons
Debate Participation (Second Reading) Date Number of Speeches
Made by All MPs
(n ¼ 634)a
Breakdown by Gender
M(n ¼ 513) F(n ¼ 124)
Bills related to healthcare:
1. Breast Cancer Billb 20-01-06 29 23 6
2. NHS Redress Bill 05-06-06 111 74 37
3. Safeguarding Vulnerable Groups Bill 19-06-06 116 44 72
4. Breastfeeding etc. Billb 20-08-06 14 13 1
5. Local Government and Public Involvement in Health Bill 22-01-07 237 171 66
6. Disabled Children (Family Support) Bill 32-02-07 105 77 28
7. Cystic Fibrosis (Exemption from Prescription Charges) Billb 23-03-07 11 6 5
8. Mental Health Bill 16-04-07 119 66 53
9. Health and Safety (Offences) Bill 27-04-07 63 47 16
SUBTOTAL: 805 521 284
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Bills related to finance:
1. Regulation of Financial Services (Land Transactions) Bill 23-06-05 29 28 1
2. Rights of Savers Bill 28-10-05 171 112 59
3. Council Tax (New Valuation Lists for England) Bill 07-11-05 296 252 44
4. Investment Exchanges and Clearing Houses Bill 28-11-06 81 78 3
5. Planning-Gain Supplement (Preparations) Bill 15-01-07 109 98 11
6. Building Societies (Funding) and Mutual Societies (Transfers) Bill 23-03-07 52 45 7
7. Finance Bill 23-04-07 258 208 50
8. Government Spending (Website) Bill 29-06-07 17 15 2
SUBTOTAL: 1013 836 177
TOTAL: 1818 1357 461
aNumber of speeches made is not equal to number of MPs who participated in debate, as many MPs speak more than once. The number of MPs (634) does not
include those with 0% attendance rate in the House of Commons (Gerry Adams, Pat Doherty, Michelle Gildernew, Gordon Marsden, Shona McIsaac, Conor
Murphy), the deputies (Sir Alan Haselhurst, Sir Michael Lord), or the Speaker of the House (Sylvia Heal).
bThree health-related bills included here had begun but were not yet completed at the second reading debate.
Source:Hansard (theOfficial Report) 2005–2007, “Volume Indexes to the House of Commons Parliamentary Debates,” parliamentary copyright. Available at http://
www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm/cmbvindx.htm.
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Commons, ranging from 0 for newly elected MPs to 12 (Sir Peter Tapsell,
Conservative). “Attendance” and “Rebellion” are both operationalized as
percentages, ranging from 0 to 100, though in the analysis these were
translated from percentages into rates. The source for these data was Dod’s
Parliamentary Communications’ “Selective Biographies for Members of
Parliament” (2007), except for attendance and rebellion rates. The source for
data on attendance and rebellion rates was The Public Whip (2007). See
Table 2, “Summary Statistics for Debate Participation Regression Models,”
for a complete list of dependent and independent variables used in the analysis.
Two separate models are used in the analysis, completely equivalent
except that Model 1 tests participation in health care-related debates and
includes the independent variable “Health Committee,” and Model 2
tests participation in finance-related debates and includes the independent
variable “Finance Committees.” The statistical models are given as:
Model 1: Health Debate Participation ¼ aˆ þ bˆ1 Seniority þ bˆ2
Female þ bˆ3 Health Committee þ bˆ4 Leadership
Position þ bˆ5 Conservative þ bˆ6 Liberal Democrat þ bˆ7
Attendance Rate þ bˆ8 Rebellion Rate þ 1ˆ
Model 2: Finance Debate Participation ¼ aˆ þ bˆ1 Seniority þ bˆ2
Female þ bˆ3 Finance Committees þ bˆ4 Leadership
Position þ bˆ5 Conservative þ bˆ6 Liberal Democrat þ bˆ7
Attendance Rate þ bˆ8 Rebellion Rate þ 1ˆ
Table 2. Summary statistics for debate participation regression models, 2005–
2007 UK House of Commons
Variable Range Mean Std.
Dev.
Health care debate participation 0 – 45 1.270 3.849
Finance debate participation 0 – 55 1.568 5.284
Health Committee membership 0 or 1 0.028 0.165
Finance and Services, Treasury, Public Accounts, or Tax
Law Rewrite (joint) Committee membership
0 or 1 0.087 0.283
Seniority (number of previous terms in office) 0 – 12 2.307 1.943
Female 0 or 1 0.194 0.396
Attendance rate (from percentage) 0 – 100 70.254 13.741
Rebellion rate (from percentage) 0 to 100 1.727 2.441
Leadership position (Cabinet or Shadow Cabinet) 0 or 1 0.076 0.266
Conservative Party 0 or 1 0.306 0.461
Liberal Democrat party 0 or 1 0.098 0.298
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Because the dependent variable is a count, the number of times a
given Member participated in debate within the categories of either health
care or finance, an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression model would
not be appropriate to fit the data (particularly as the data are discrete rather
than continuous). The negative binomial model was chosen as the best
method for analyzing the debate participation models of the British House
of Commons. STATA v.9 was used for all analyses.
ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS
Please refer to Table 3, Negative Binomial Regression of Debate
Participation Models, for the results of the fitted regression models. The
table gives coefficients and standard errors for Model 1, where the
response variable was participation in health care debates, and Model 2,
where the response variable was participation in finance debates.
Incidence rate ratios, that is, exp(b1) rather than b1, are also given with
similarly transformed standard errors. Rate ratios describe the
multiplicative change in the expected count when the explanatory
variable increases by one unit, while all the other explanatory variables
remain unchanged.
The results of the two regression models were not identical, indicating
that separate patterns characterize health care and finance debates. In
health care debates, the analysis suggests that the most significant
predictors of debate participation are seniority (–), Conservative party
(þ), attendance rate (þ), and female sex (þ). Leadership position also
had a borderline significant effect (þ), as did Liberal Democrat party
(þ), all other variables held at constant. In finance debates, findings
show that the most significant predictors of debate participation are
relevant committee membership (þ), Conservative party (þ), and
seniority (–), holding other explanatory variables at constant. Sex was not
significant, holding all other explanatory variables at constant. The
following detailed analysis of results analyzes the effects of sex and the
other explanatory variables on health care and finance debates.
Findings for the key variable for this study, sex, show that female sex is
significant and a positive predictor of participation in health care debates,
but not significant at standard levels in finance debates. Being a female
increases the likelihood of participation in health care debates by a factor of
2.224, or 122%, as compared to men, holding all other explanatory
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variables at constant. It is interesting to note that being a female does not affect
likelihood of participation in finance debates, despite the descriptive statistics
that show disproportionate male interventions (82.5% of all interventions in
finance debates are made by men, while men compose a slightly lesser
80.5% of all MPs; see Tables 1 and 2) when all other variables are held at
constant. A chi-square analysis of gender and finance debate participation
finds that, in fact, 23% of women MPs participated in finance debates,
compared to 20% of men (not significant at standard levels). The analysis
suggests that men may participate more prolifically than women, with those
men who speak making a greater number of interventions on the average
than those women who speak, though women are just as likely to
participate. This would coincide with some women MPs’ criticisms of
male MPs’ debating style, specifically claims that men have a tendency
toward repetition: “a lot of men, you know, like the sound of their own
voice” (Childs 2004, 6).
Table 3. Negative Binomial Regression of debate participation models, 2005–
2007 UK House of Commons
Variable (Predicted
Effect)
Model 1
(Health Care)
Model 1
Rate Ratios
Model 2
(Finance)
Model 2
Rate Ratios
Health Committee (þ) 0.625
(0.772)
1.687
(1.359)
Finance Committees (þ) 1.052**
(0.519)
2.714**
(1.407)
Seniority (þ) 20.277***
(0.074)
0.760***
(0.057)
20.285***
(0.087)
0.764***
(0.068)
Female (þ Model 1/
2Model 2)
0.789**
(0.344)
2.224**
(0.773)
20.415
(0.399)
0.666
(0.265)
Attendance (þ) 0.025**
(0.010)
1.025**
(0.010)
20.006
(0.009)
0.994
(.009)
Rebellion (þ) 20.004
(0.061)
0.990
(0.060)
20.096
(0.083)
0.906
(0.076)
Leadership (þ) 0.813*
(0.500)
2.218*
(1.116)
0.434
(0.546)
1.447
(0.792)
Conservative (þ) 0.649**
(0.309)
1.898**
(0.591)
0.618**
(0.342)
1.824**
(0.619)
Liberal Democrat (2) 0.888*
(0.506)
2.384*
(1.231)
20.057
(0.516)
0.839
(0.439)
Notes: Dependent variable: Debate participation ¼ number of times MP spoke in health care (Model
1) or finance-related (Model 2) debates in the 2005–2007 UKHouse of Commons. The sign following
each variable is the predicted sign of the coefficient. Coefficients and incidence rate ratios are followed
by standard errors, in parentheses.
*p, 0.10, **p, 0.05, ***p, 0.01.
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Two variables, Conservative Party membership and seniority, were
consistently significant across both models. Both variables carried similar
coefficients across the two models, indicating similar effects on the two
response variables. Confirming initial hypotheses, Conservative Party
members were more likely to speak in debate than other MPs, holding
other explanatory variables at constant. Being a Conservative MP increases
the likelihood of participation in both health care and finance debates by a
factor of about 1.85, or 85%, compared to MPs from other parties. This
provides some evidence in support of the intuition that opposition MPs
use parliamentary debate as an opportunity to question and state their
party’s disagreements with government policy proposals. In contrast to
original hypotheses, seniority, or number of terms in office, had the effect
of decreasing the likelihood of an MP participating in debate, holding
other variables at constant. If an MP were to increase his or her number of
terms in office by one unit, his or her participation in both health care and
finance debates would be expected to decrease by a factor of 0.76, or 24%,
while holding the other variables constant in the model. This finding
suggests that the traditional theory that Members with greater experience
and seniority are more likely to speak in debate merits additional research.
Many of the remaining initial hypotheses about the qualities that make
an MP more likely to speak in debate are confirmed in the health care
model — namely, leadership position (þ), Liberal Democrat party (þ),
and attendance rate (þ). MPs with leadership positions were more likely
to participate in health care debates. Members of the Cabinet or Shadow
Cabinet are expected to have a rate ratio of 2.218 times greater, or 120%,
for health care debate participation compared to other MPs (significant
at 0.10 level), while holding the other explanatory variables at constant.
Members of the Liberal Democratic party are also more likely to speak
in health care debates than other MPs. Being a Liberal Democrat MP
increases the likelihood of speaking in health care debates by a factor of
2.384, or 138%, compared to other party MPs (significant at 0.10 level),
holding all other explanatory variables at constant. Finally, Members
with greater attendance rates are more likely to speak in health care
debates. Increasing attendance rate by 1 point has the effect of increasing
an MP’s expected health care debate participation by a factor of 1.025, or
2.5%, holding other explanatory variables at constant. The effect may
seem small, but if attendance rate is increased by 10 points, an MP’s
expected participation increases by 25%, holding other variables at
constant. Relevant committee membership and rebellion rate were not
significant at standard levels for the health care model.
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In contrast with the health care model, findings for the finance model
suggest a more constrained debate in terms of the types of MPs likely to
participate. Leadership position, Liberal Democrat party, attendance rate,
and rebellion rate are all not significant at standard levels for finance
debates. Relevant committee membership, however, is significant and
positive. All other variables held at constant, finance committee
membership increases the likelihood of participating in finance debates by
a factor of 2.714, or 170%, as compared to those without relevant
committee membership. Perhaps committee membership affects finance
but not health care debate participation because there are more finance-
related committees (n ¼ 4) than health committees (n ¼ 1). The
allocation of greater political resources to finance (number of select
committees) and the tendency for committee members to participate more
frequently in finance debates suggests that finance may be seen as a subject
in which only experts should participate, whereas health, as a soft policy
issue, may not be treated the same way.
The dissimilar results of the two regression models indicate that separate
patterns of participation characterize health care and finance debates.
Different types of MPs are likely to speak in health care debates and
finance debates. A more diverse group of MPs is likely to speak in health
care debates compared to finance debates. This may be because finance is
perceived as a subject in which only experts should contribute their views
(i.e. select committee members). Gender is likely a factor that interacts
many of these variables, and it affects an MP’s perceptions about whether
his or her voice is appropriate and relevant to the debate. The findings of
many of the explanatory variables are interesting in and of themselves and
merit additional discussion, though a full analysis of what affects debate
participation in general lies outside the scope of this study.
DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS
This study has attempted to contribute some empirical evidence for
examining the notion of “women acting for women.” The results of
analyzing representatives’ participation in health care and finance second-
reading bill debates in the British House of Commons 2005–2007 give
additional, empirical proof to the growing consensus that women MPs are
making a difference for women’s substantive representation. Sex makes a
difference in the likelihood of an MP contributing his or her voice to the
formal policy discussion of different issue areas. Women MPs participate
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disproportionately in debates on issues of health care, suggesting that women
MPs are using debate as a forum to achieve greater substantive representation
in areas of perceived “women’s interest.” Overall, what do these findings say
about the relationship between descriptive and substantive representation?
Beyond the numbers showing that women participate more frequently
than men in health care debates, some preliminary qualitative analyses
suggest that women are voicing concerns for women in particular.
Taking a closer look at the nine bills used in the health care analysis,
one can see that many of them address issues that concern women
specifically and disproportionately (see Table 1). In the debate on the
Safeguarding Vulnerable Groups Bill (June 19, 2006), for example,
women made 72 of the 116 interventions. “Vulnerable groups” is highly
gendered, both as a term often used as a proxy for “women and
children” (or even phrased, “Women, children, and other vulnerable
groups,” e.g., in NATO and the UN), and as a stark reality: Women face
greater threats of economic insecurity, sexual exploitation, and domestic
and other forms of violence than do men. Looking at the discussion in
greater detail, women from both sides of the floor highlighted the
background of the bill, the 2002 murders of the two young girls, Holly
Wells and Jessica Chapman. The outcry over the failure to stop Ian
Huntley from working at the Soham school where he went on to murder
the girls led directly to the bill. The bill is now an act, which in 2007
introduced a new vetting/barring scheme to prevent unsuitable people
from working with children and vulnerable adults, among other
provisions. Women MPs’ strong participation in the debate of this bill
may have had an impact on its passing into law and the subsequent
protection of more women from harm.
Women also contributed disproportionately to the debate on theMental
Health Bill (April 16, 2007), making some 53 of the 119 interventions.
There are gender differences with respect to men’s and women’s
experience of mental health in England: 20% of women are reported as
having some form of mental illness, compared to 14% of men
(Economic and Social Research Council 2007).1 In her introduction of
the bill, Minister for Health Patricia Hewitt spoke about caring for her
sister, who suffers from mental ill health. Although women MPs’
1. It is important to note that these figures may not be indicative of the true incidence rates, as social
stigma is thought to prevent men from reporting mental ill health. It is common for both alcohol and
drugs to be used to hide the symptoms of mental illness, and men are three times more likely than
women to be dependent on alcohol, and twice as likely to be dependent on drugs (Economic and
Social Research Council 2007).
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disproportionate participation rates in the debate indicate that mental
health is an important issue for women MPs and women in general, the
contentious debate of the bill’s provisions shows that agreement does not
extend to the way in which the issue ought to be addressed. This
confirms previous findings that women representatives share a broad
concern for certain women’s issues but that this is intertwined with party
identity, as one female MP asserted: “It’s when you come to the next
stage about proposed policy and solutions then [you] get the divergence”
(Childs 2006, 13; see also Norris and Lovenduski 1995). The divergence
in this case was about whether the strict measures set out in the Mental
Health Bill would protect the vulnerable people whom a severely
mentally ill person could potentially harm, including themselves, or
whether the measures were too severe, even draconian.
This article confirms the findings of many qualitative analyses, that
women MPs see themselves as representing women in particular (but
not exclusively). The evidence suggests that the presence of women in
representative politics is likely to push policy debate toward issues that
women give greater importance. The findings add to the growing
consensus across the literature that women representatives often act
differently from men, if not exclusively “for” women. This study might
be enhanced by analyzing sex and debate participation in additional
policy areas, such as education and skills, foreign affairs, and defense. It
would be interesting to see if standard perceptions of the gendered
nature of each issue area hold up in analysis (e.g., is education a
“women’s issue?”). The study would also be improved by undertaking
the analysis over a greater period of time, for example, over an entire
legislature, or several.
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